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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
These cross-appeals present interesting questions 
concerning the amount-in-controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction, the extent to which an attorney 
holding a contingent-fee agreement may charge additional 
fees for collecting the proceeds of a settlement or judgment, 
and the proper administration of trusts by trustees and the 
beneficiaries' remedies for errors therein under 
Pennsylvania law. The principal appellant is defendant 
Mark S. Haltzman, a member of the Pennsylvania bar and 
a trustee of the Glen Eagle Square Equity Associates Trust 
(the "Trust"). Haltzman successfully represented Catherine 
A. Backos, a codefendant and co trustee, in a separate civil 
RICO claim brought by her and Glen Eagle Square Equity 
Associates ("GESEA"), in which she was a major 
shareholder, on a contingent fee basis. In order to 
administer and distribute the proceeds of settlement of the 
RICO claim, Haltzman and Backos established the Trust, 
naming themselves as trustees. There were numerous 
beneficiaries, including two shareholders and creditors of 
GESEA -- Nick Dardovitch, the plaintiff and cross- 
appellant, and Backos -- and also Haltzman himself, whose 
interest sprang from his contingent fee. As part of his 
efforts in administering the Trust, Haltzman took steps to 
collect on the notes that constituted the trust corpus. He 
paid himself an attorney's fee for this action out of the 
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Trust's funds, and this case centers on the propriety of 
Haltzman's acceptance of these additional fees. 
 
As always, the threshold question is one of jurisdiction. 
Dardovitch alleged, and the District Court found, that his 
claim fell within the District Court's diversity jurisdiction. 
Haltzman argues that this subject-matter jurisdiction is 
lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement. Haltzman contends 
that the amount in controversy is determined by payments 
presently due. That is ordinarily the case. But where, as 
here, the plaintiff had good cause to believe that he needed 
to bring suit to establish his right to receive any funds 
under the trust, the entire amount of the plaintiff 's interest 
in the trust can become the amount in controversy. Since 
this amount substantially exceeded the jurisdictional 
amount, the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
Both Haltzman and Dardovitch raise numerous issues 
relating to the District Court's decision on the merits. The 
central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a 
contingent-fee agreement that is not specific on the point is 
entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the 
settlement or judgment. The District Court concluded that 
Haltzman's fee under the original contingent fee agreement 
included both his actions in securing a settlement and any 
steps necessary to collect the proceeds of the settlement, 
and that he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for 
the collection actions. The District Court thus held that 
Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by 
accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the 
Trust's sole assets. 
 
Haltzman challenges this reading of the Trust and 
contingent fee agreement, arguing that they were limited to 
his prosecution of the action to judgment, and did not 
include his collection efforts. In analyzing the fee 
agreement, the District Court looked at a variety of factors, 
including the fact that Haltzman himself drafted the 
agreement; the terms of the agreement; and the general 
understanding of contingent-fee agreements. It also 
considered, but rejected as self-serving, Backos's testimony 
concerning her intent in entering into the agreement. We 
conclude that the District Court's findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law as to the meaning of the retainer 
agreement and the Trust must be upheld. 
 
Haltzman also challenges the District Court's award of 
attorney's fees to Dardovitch. The court ordered Haltzman 
to pay part of Dardovitch's attorney's fees based on general 
equitable principles applicable in trust cases. Without 
holding a hearing, the court ordered Haltzman to pay most 
of Dardovitch's accrued fees from the beginning of the suit 
until the court granted Dardovitch partial summary 
judgment and ordered an accounting. This award was 
based on the conclusion that most of this work was 
necessitated by Haltzman's continued refusal to admit that 
Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust. The court also 
ordered Haltzman to pay one-quarter of the fees Dardovitch 
had paid for his attorneys' work subsequent to the 
accounting. This latter award was based on the fact that 
some of Dardovitch's objections to Haltzman and Backos's 
accounting were sustained, although many were not. 
 
We agree with the general propriety of directing Haltzman 
to pay Dardovitch's fees. However, because the District 
Court held no hearing, did not adequately explain the basis 
of its fee calculation, and in particular did not sufficiently 
tie the award to the factors warranting the award, we will 
vacate the district court's order and remand with 
instructions to hold a hearing to recalculate the attorney's 
fee award based on the reasonableness of the claimed fees. 
On remand, the court should examine the claims carefully 
to ensure that the claimed fees are sufficiently related to 
the justifications for the fee award. 
 
In his cross-appeal, Dardovitch challenges the District 
Court's conclusion that Backos should not be jointly liable 
for Haltzman's breach of his fiduciary duty. The District 
Court relieved Backos of liability because it concluded that 
she relied on Haltzman to such an extent in legal matters 
that his breach cannot fairly be attributed to her. Under 
Pennsylvania law, a trustee is obligated to exercise 
reasonable care to ensure that her co-trustees do not 
breach their fiduciary duties. A trustee who breaches this 
duty may become jointly liable for the breaches of the co- 
trustee. Furthermore, reliance on the advice of counsel is 
only one factor to be considered in determining whether a 
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trustee acted reasonably, and even then the reliance itself 
must be reasonable. The Court's decision, which seems to 
have applied at most a subjective reasonableness standard, 
appears to be contrary to the objective reasonableness 
standard of Pennsylvania law. Accordingly, we will vacate 
the District Court's order and remand Dardovitch's claim 
against Backos so that the court can evaluate her liability 
under the correct standard, i.e., whether she exercised 
reasonable care to ensure that Haltzman did not breach his 
fiduciary duty. The orders of the District Court will thus be 
affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
This case originated in the settlement of a civil RICO suit 
brought by Backos and GESEA. GESEA was organized to 
purchase and operate a shopping center. Its shareholders 
included Backos (55%), Dardovitch (15%) and two of 
Backos's siblings (15% each). GESEA obtained 
commitments from various financing companies, but these 
firms backed away from their commitments. As a result, 
the shopping center was sold to another entity, and in 1993 
Backos and GESEA filed a civil RICO suit against the 
various financing companies. This suit was the sole 
business of GESEA at that time and subsequently. Backos 
retained Haltzman to represent her and GESEA. Haltzman 
initially proposed that he would do the work for a 30% 
contingent fee plus expenses to be paid promptly, with a 
retainer which was paid up front. See App. at 1774-77. In 
May 1993, GESEA adopted a shareholder resolution 
providing that Haltzman's fee, including expenses, would be 
capped at 30% of the recovery. See App. at 1530-34. This 
shareholder resolution was subsequently amended in 
August 1993 to reflect that the fee was to be a 30% 
contingent fee, not including expenses. 
 
In January 1994, when Backos was unable to keep 
current with her payments to Haltzman for litigation 
expenses, the representation agreement was again amended 
to provide a priority for Haltzman in the proceeds of the 
litigation. See App. at 1778-79. Under the amended 
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agreement, Haltzman was to receive the entire first 
$150,000 of any sums received as a result of the litigation; 
Backos and GESEA were to receive the next $150,000; and 
Haltzman was to be entitled to 30% of the next $1.7 million 
and 15% of any recovery over $2 million. Shortly thereafter, 
the suit settled for $994,000. The settlement agreement 
provided that Backos and GESEA would be paid via long- 
term, non-interest-bearing notes in this amount. 
 
Apparently out of concern that GESEA's creditors would 
immediately claim all of the money, Backos and GESEA set 
up a trust -- the GESEA Trust -- for the receipt and 
distribution of the proceeds of the settlement. Haltzman 
and Backos were named trustees. The proceeds were to be 
distributed in accordance with the representation 
agreement, along with certain payments to GESEA's 
creditors. The remaining money due GESEA was to be 
distributed to the shareholders in proportion to their 
interests. See App. at 1574-79. Dardovitch's share of the 
$994,000 settlement was $104,000, although it was only 
due and payable as the Trust received it. Prior to the filing 
of the complaint in this case, Haltzman informed 
Dardovitch by letter that only about $30,000 was due to 
him at that time. 
 
It became clear after the settlement that it would be 
difficult to collect on the notes. Accordingly, Haltzman took 
legal measures. See, e.g., Glen Eagle Square Equity Assocs. 
Trust v. DSL Capital Corp., No. CIV. A. 95-7939, 1996 WL 
689113 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (entering judgment in 
favor of plaintiff on action confessing judgment on one of 
the aforementioned promissory notes). Ultimately, Haltzman 
conducted work for which he billed the Trust approximately 
$63,000 on an hourly basis. As of May 1997, the Trust had 
received $335,000, of which $172,000 was paid out as legal 
fees and $44,000 as litigation costs, to Haltzman. Thus, 
64.5% of the money thus far received has gone to pay legal 
fees and costs. 
 
Although Dardovitch was informed of the creation of the 
Trust and received a copy of the distribution schedule of 
funds from it, he received little additional information from 
Haltzman or Backos concerning the status or nature of the 
Trust. Accordingly, he asked them about the income and 
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expenditures of the Trust in order to determine whether 
they were managing it properly, and whether any money 
was due him. Haltzman and Backos, however, gave him no 
information; indeed, by August 1996, Dardovitch still had 
not received any information on or money from the Trust. 
Although Backos subsequently provided him with some 
information, it was incomplete and inaccurate, and 
Dardovitch again requested information from Haltzman. 
 
Haltzman finally responded on December 10, 1996, by 
sending a letter containing the following language to 
Dardovitch's lawyer: 
 
       Please be advised that Nick Dardovitch is not a 
       beneficiary of the Trust Agreement, as the beneficiaries 
       of the Trust are Glen Eagle Square Equity Associates, 
       Inc. and Catherine Backos. Accordingly, even if the 
       information you requested in your letter was 
       appropriate (which it is not), he is not entitled to an 
       accounting. Further, the Trust document itself does 
       not require that the Trustee provide an accounting to 
       the beneficiaries. 
 
        Please also be advised that Mr. Dardovitch has, in 
       the past, acted detrimentally to the best interests of 
       Glen Eagle Square Equity Associates, Inc. I suggest 
       that Mr. Dardovitch consider his prior action and his 
       possible liability as to same before he elects to take 
       actions which will expose himself to potential liability. 
 
        Please be further advised that to the extent that your 
       office decides to bring litigation, which would be 
       improper based on the fact that Mr. Dardovitch is not 
       a beneficiary of the Trust, the Trust will seek to hold 
       your firm, as well as Mr. Dardovitch, liable for all of its 
       costs and expenses and will seek damages for 
       malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Your letter 
       is apparently a continuation of Mr. Dardovitch's past 
       guerilla tactics in attempting to extort money to which 
       he was not entitled. 
 
App. at 58 (emphasis added). 
 
On January 6, 1997, Dardovitch filed suit against 
Haltzman, Backos, and the Trust for amounts due him and 
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for an accounting. Haltzman and Backos defended by 
challenging jurisdiction and denying that Dardovitch was a 
beneficiary of the Trust. The District Court initially 
determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction, see App. 
at 84-85, and that Haltzman was not entitled to a jury trial, 
see App. at 820. It then granted partial summary judgment 
in favor of Dardovitch, concluding that he was clearly a 
beneficiary, and ordered an accounting. See  Dist. Ct. Order, 
App. at 812-19. 
 
Dardovitch then challenged certain aspects of the 
accounting, and the Court held a hearing. See Dardovitch v. 
Haltzman, Civ. A. No. 97-52, 1998 WL 13271 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
13, 1998). The Court concluded that Dardovitch could not 
challenge pre-Trust transactions, see 1998 WL 13271, at 
*2-*3, and that Backos had not breached her fiduciary 
duty, see 1998 WL 13271, at *8 n.28. It also found that 
Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty by claiming 
attorney's fees for the collection costs, and ordered him to 
refund the fees to the Trust. See 1998 WL 13271, at *4-*7. 
Because of certain setoffs, however, the Court ultimately 
found that Haltzman had to pay about $14,000 back to the 
Trust. See Appellant's Brf. App. 2, at 6-7. The District 
Court also ordered Haltzman to pay most of Dardovitch's 
attorney's fees from before the accounting, as well as one- 
quarter of his post-Accounting fees, for a total of 
approximately $64,000. See Appellant's Brf. App. 1. 
 
Haltzman appeals from the District Court's orders 
making a variety of challenges, some of which we dispose of 
summarily in the margin. In particular, he challenges the 
District Court's decisions finding subject-matter 
jurisdiction, denying his request for a jury trial; 1 imposition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We agree with the District Court that Haltzman was not entitled to a 
jury trial with respect to the accounting. A party ordinarily does not 
have 
a right to a jury trial in an equitable proceeding. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that an accounting must be tried to a jury in certain 
circumstances, i.e., where the accounting is sought merely because of 
the complicated nature of the accounts, or where the accounting is 
ancillary to an equitable claim and is in essence a claim for repayment 
of a debt. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (holding 
that an accounting must be tried to a jury where it is in actuality a 
claim 
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of a surcharge on him;2 and awarding Dardovitch attorney's 
fees. Dardovitch cross-appeals, challenging the District 
Court's denial of his claims regarding pre-Trust transactions,3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for repayment of a debt); 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure S 2310, at 87-91 (2d ed. 1994). Where the 
duty to account is itself equitable, however, no right to a jury trial 
arises. 
See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950) ("The Seventh 
Amendment . . . [is] applicable only to actions at law," not "an equity 
action for an injunction and accounting." (citation and footnote 
omitted)); 
9 Wright & Miller, supra, S 2310, at 90. An action for an accounting of 
a trust is quintessentially equitable. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
S 197 (all remedies of a beneficiary against a trustee are equitable, 
except 
for a claim for money immediately and unconditionally due to the 
beneficiary or a claim to transfer chattel that the trustee is under an 
immediate and unconditional duty to transfer to the beneficiary). 
Accordingly, a party to a trust accounting has no right to a jury trial; 
that is the situation here. 
 
2. Haltzman challenges several aspects of the District Court's calculation 
of the amount of the surcharge he had to pay, in addition to his 
challenge to the District Court's conclusion that he was not entitled to 
additional hourly fees for the collection actions. We find no error in the 
District Court's reasoning rejecting these claims. See Dist. Ct. Order, 
Appellant's Brf. App. 2, at 4 n.2, 5 & n.3. 
 
Dardovitch challenges different aspects of the District Court's 
calculation of the surcharge. He argues that the District Court erred in 
allowing Haltzman to receive attorney's fees from the Trust for litigation 
against the Hanaway group of creditors. In particular, he contends that 
Haltzman should not be permitted to recover these fees from the Trust 
because his actions in defense of the Hanaway's claims were in breach 
of his fiduciary duty to the Trust. The District Court rejected 
Dardovitch's objection to this payment, concluding that Haltzman's work 
was, in this case, not covered by the contingent fee agreement and 
resulted in a benefit to the Trust. See App. at 1398-99; Appellant's Brf. 
App. 2, at 5-6. We see no clear error in the District Court's conclusion, 
and will affirm its order on this point. 
 
3. In his cross-appeal, Dardovitch disputes inter alia the District 
Court's 
conclusion that he has no standing to challenge certain actions Backos 
and Haltzman took before the Trust was executed and, in any case, that 
the challenge was barred by laches. Dardovitch contends that Backos 
and Haltzman breached their duties to the other shareholders of GESEA 
by entering into the contingent-fee agreement. The District Court held 
that Dardovitch lacked standing as either a shareholder -- since he did 
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and Backos's own conduct and potential liability for the 
surcharge. Since this is a diversity case arising in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, we apply Pennsylvania 
law. 
 
II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Dardovitch brought his claim under the District Court's 
diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S 1332.4 Dardovitch 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not bring a proper shareholder derivative suit -- or a beneficiary of the 
Trust -- since the Trust had not yet taken effect. Dardovitch now argues 
that he has standing to challenge the pre-Trust transactions as a 
creditor of GESEA under either the "trust fund doctrine" or the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
SS 5101-10 (1998 Supp.) (applicable to transactions after February 1, 
1994), and the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 39 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. SS 351-63 (repealed 1993) (applicable to transactions before 
that date) [hereinafter collectively "PUFT/CA"]. Neither of these applies 
to 
this case, however. The "trust fund doctrine" makes the creditors of a 
corporation the beneficiaries of a trust consisting of the corporate 
assets, 
but only after a court order creating the trust, which did not occur in 
this case. PUFT/CA only applies to certain kinds of transactions, and 
only prohibits them if they are not for fair consideration and will render 
the corporation insolvent. See 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 5101, 5105. Since 
the transactions that Dardovitch challenges do not meet some or all of 
these requirements, he cannot challenge them under PUFT/CA either. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's rejection of Dardovitch's 
objections to pre-Trust transactions. We need not and do not decide 
whether the District Court erred in concluding that Dardovitch was 
barred from asserting these challenges by laches. 
 
4. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions 
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $50,000, exclusive 
of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States." 
S 1332(a)(1). Section 1332(a) was amended in 1996 to require that the 
amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See Pub. L. No. 104-317, 
S 205(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3850 (1996). This amendment took effect on 
January 14, 1997. See S 295(b). Accordingly, since Dardovitch filed suit 
on January 6, 1997, the required amount in controversy was $50,000, 
as Dardovitch alleged in his complaint. The precise amount-in- 
controversy requirement is not terribly important in this case, however, 
since it either exceeded $75,000 or was less than $50,000. The District 
Court purported to apply the new $75,000 requirement. See Dardovitch, 
1998 WL 13271, at *1 n.1. 
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alleged, and Backos and Haltzman did not contest, that he 
is a citizen of Florida and that they were citizens of 
Pennsylvania. The only question before us is, whether the 
amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. At the time he 
filed the complaint, Dardovitch was only due about $34,000 
from the Trust. His entire interest in the Trust, however, 
was $104,000. We must determine which of these two 
sums represents the amount in controversy. 
 
The amount in controversy is determined from the good 
faith allegations in the complaint. See Spectacor Mgt. Group 
v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1799 (1998). "The sum claimed by the plaintiff 
controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It 
must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for 
less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal." St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288- 
89 (1938). Where a plaintiff brings a suit for payment of 
money as part of an ongoing and continually accruing 
obligation, such as an installment contract, the amount in 
controversy is generally limited to the amount then due and 
owing, even if a judgment would have collateral estoppel 
effects on liability for future payments. See Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Flowers, 330 U.S. 464, 467 (1947) ("If this case 
were one where judgment could be entered only for the 
installments due at the time of the commencement of the 
suit, future installments could not be considered in 
determining whether the jurisdictional amount was 
involved, even though the judgment would be determinative 
of liability for future installments as they accrued."). Where, 
by contrast, a suit is brought to establish directly the right 
to receive any payments because the putative defendant 
has repudiated that right entirely, and not just with respect 
to current payments, the amount in controversy is the 
entire amount that may ever come due. See Aetna , 330 U.S. 
at 469 (finding jurisdiction where a statute permitted a 
single action to establish the right to workers' 
compensation insurance installment payments, even 
though currently due payments did not exceed the 
jurisdictional amount; amount in controversy included 
future payments where the right to all the payments was in 
issue). 
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Haltzman submits that Dardovitch's complaint only put 
the currently due and owing payments in issue. 
 643<!>Specifically, Haltzman notes that, in his complaint, 
 
Dardovitch only requests payment of amounts presently 
due, not a determination of amounts that might come due 
in the future. See App. at 22. At the time he filed his 
complaint, Dardovitch had been informed that the amount 
then due would be at most slightly more than $30,000. See 
App. at 1805-14. Accordingly, Haltzman submits that 
Dardovitch could not allege in good faith that the amount 
in controversy exceeded $50,000. 
 
We disagree. The District Court correctly concluded that 
the entire amount to which Dardovitch would ever be 
entitled under the Trust was in controversy, because one of 
the issues in this case -- one that was in fact heavily 
contested -- was whether Dardovitch was a beneficiary of 
the Trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 3(4) ("The 
person for whose benefit property is held in trust is the 
beneficiary."). An allegation or claim that a person is not a 
beneficiary of a trust is an allegation or claim that the 
person is not entitled to receive any of the proceeds of the 
trust. Accordingly, a suit to establish one's status as a 
beneficiary puts the entire amount of one's alleged interest 
in the trust in controversy. 
 
Haltzman concedes that he denied that Dardovitch was a 
beneficiary. He attempts to justify this by saying this he 
intended only to deny that Dardovitch was entitled to 
demand an accounting or any other information concerning 
the Trust. The evidence in the record supports this 
contention. See App. at 56 (December 10, 1996 letter). This 
does not, however, imply that Dardovitch did not 
reasonably and in good faith believe that he needed to bring 
suit to establish his right as a beneficiary to receive his 
share of the proceeds of the Trust. To the contrary, an 
examination of the evidence, including that set forth in the 
margin,5 shows that it was eminently reasonable for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Haltzman has consistently denied that Dardovitch was a beneficiary of 
the Trust. Haltzman begins the December 10, 1996, letter by asserting 
that "Nick Dardovitch is not a beneficiary of the Trust Agreement." App. 
at 56. In his answer to the complaint, Haltzman again denied that 
Dardovitch "is a named `beneficiary' of the trust as the named 
beneficiaries are Catherine Backos and Glen Eagle Square Equity 
Associates, Inc." App. at 99. 
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Dardovitch to think that he needed to do so. Furthermore, 
Haltzman litigated the issue of Dardovitch's status as a 
beneficiary extensively, and perhaps even excessively.6 
 
Based on the foregoing facts, Dardovitch had good cause 
to believe that Haltzman had no intention of ever paying 
him any money out of the Trust; Haltzman's own 
statements apparently to that effect provide a strong basis 
for such a belief. Furthermore, it appears that Dardovitch 
in fact believed at the time he filed the complaint that he 
needed to bring suit to establish his right to receive any 
money from the Trust.7 In sum, Dardovitch alleged in good 
faith -- based on Haltzman's repeated statements to that 
effect -- that Haltzman had repudiated any obligation he 
had as a trustee to pay the proceeds of the Trust to 
Dardovitch as a beneficiary. Since it is not disputed here 
that Dardovitch's interest in the Trust was approximately 
$104,000, and this amount exceeds the jurisdictional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Dardovitch, 1998 WL 12371, at *7 ("Backos and Haltzman spent 
the better part of this long, acrimonious litigation resisting 
Dardovitch's 
demand to provide an account or even a copy of the Trust instrument, 
insisting from the beginning that he was not a beneficiary of the 
Trust."). 
Even after the District Court granted Dardovitch's motion for partial 
summary judgment and ordered an accounting on the sole ground that 
Dardovitch was, in fact, a beneficiary of the Trust, Haltzman continued 
to deny it. See 1998 WL 12371, at *7; see also App. at 899, 955. 
Although Haltzman now concedes that Dardovitch is a beneficiary of the 
Trust, and does not challenge the District Court's conclusion to that 
effect on appeal, this late concession cannot change the result. 
 
7. Dardovitch alleged in his complaint that Haltzman denied that 
Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust, and further alleged that as a 
beneficiary he was entitled to receive distributions from the Trust. See 
App. at 21-22. In his response to Haltzman's motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction, Dardovitch again referred to Haltzman's 
December 10, 1996, letter -- as well as Backos's answer to the 
complaint and Haltzman's affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss 
-- denying that Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust. He specifically 
stated: "Whether plaintiff was entitled to distribution in excess of 
$50,000 on January 6, 1997, is immaterial, because Mr. Haltzman 
absolutely repudiated Mr. Dardovitch's entire claimed interests in the 
trust on December 10, 1996." App. at 64. 
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requirement under S 1332, the District Court properly 
concluded it had subject-matter jurisdiction.8 
 
III. Haltzman Acceptance of Attorney's Fees for the 
Collection Actions 
 
A. Background 
 
Haltzman next argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that he breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust. 
The District Court reasoned that by paying himself fees for 
collecting on the notes held by the Trust, Haltzman did so 
because his fees for the prior litigation included fees for the 
collection actions. Haltzman submits that he was legally 
entitled to such fees. 
 
Dardovitch contends that the Trust and the retainer 
agreement provided that Haltzman's fees for undertaking 
the RICO litigation would also cover any steps he took to 
collect on the notes received in settlement of the litigation. 
He notes that the Trust provided for two categories of 
payments to Haltzman. First, it directed that expenses 
incurred by Haltzman in connection with the prosecution of 
the RICO litigation be paid out of the Trust. Second, it 
directed that the legal fees owed to Haltzman be paid "in 
strict accordance with the engagement agreement entered 
into" between Haltzman, Backos and GESEA. App. at 1766. 
Since the Trust incorporates the retainer agreement by 
reference, we must consider the language of the 
representation agreement itself. 
 
Initially, in his proposal for representation, Haltzman 
agreed to the representation "on a contingency fee basis of 
30% of any amount recovered . . . . [M]ajor out-of-pocket 
expenses for such things as deposition transcripts and 
filing fees will be payable currently on a 30 day basis." App. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Dardovitch claimed, and the District Court appears to have agreed, 
that he met the jurisdictional amount requirement by an alternative 
method: in a claim for an accounting, the amount in controversy is the 
claimants' entire interest in the trust. Since we conclude that the 
amount-in-controversy requirement was otherwise met, we need not 
decide this question. 
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at 1775. Thereafter, GESEA adopted a shareholder 
agreement providing that "[t]he total of litigation fees and 
expenses (including reimbursements of shareholders) shall 
not exceed thirty percent (30%) of any recovery." App. at 
1530-31. This agreement was subsequently amended to 
permit payment of expenses in addition to the fee of thirty 
percent of any recovery. App. at 1094. Still later, the 
representation agreement was amended, in a document 
signed by Haltzman and Backos, to provide that in addition 
to payment of expenses, "Mark S. Haltzman will receive, as 
a fee, the first $150,000 of any recovery received in the 
lawsuit," along with thirty percent of any recovery in excess 
of $300,000. App. at 1778. Dardovitch contends that this 
language covers not only the RICO litigation itself, but also 
any collateral steps taken to collect on the judgment. 
 
Haltzman contends, however, that a different provision of 
the Trust governs the payment of attorney's fees for 
collecting on the notes: 
 
        In the administration of the Trust, the Trustees shall 
       have the following powers, all of which shall be 
       exercised in a fiduciary capacity, primarily in the 
       interest of the Glen Eagle Square Equity Associates, 
       Inc. and Catherine Backos; 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . . [T]o enforce any Notes, bonds, mortgages, 
       security agreements, or other obligations; . . . . 
 
        To incur and pay the ordinary and necessary 
       expenses of administration including (but not by way of 
       limitation) reasonable attorneys' fees, accountants' 
       fees, investment counsel fees, and the like. 
 
App. at 1767-68. Haltzman submits that, pursuant to this 
provision, he had the power to undertake actions to enforce 
and collect on the notes, and further to pay himself 
attorney's fees for those actions if he chose to use his own 
professional services for such purposes. Also, as set forth in 
the margin, Backos testified that it was her intent that 
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Haltzman would be paid additional fees out of the Trust for 
his professional services in collecting on the notes.9 
 
The District Court determined that Haltzman should not 
have accepted payments separate from those he received 
under the retainer agreement for work he undertook in 
collecting on the notes when the payors went into default, 
because the agreement, as incorporated into the Trust, 
already required him to do this work. The court based this 
conclusion on several grounds, including that ordinary 
rules of contract construction and interpretation dictated 
this reading of the retainer agreement, and that contingent 
fee agreements generally require the attorney to undertake 
efforts to collect the proceeds of the suit. We will discuss 
these factors in turn.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Backos testified as follows: 
 
        Q: My first question to you is: What was your understanding in 
       connection with the Fee Agreement you had with Mark S. Haltzman 
       Associates, as to whether that firm was obligated to go out and 
       collect the judgment that they were going to try to get for you in 
the 
       litigation? 
 
        A: My understanding was that the collection process, if we had to 
       undertake that, was a separate matter, it was a separate 
litigation. 
 
App. at 1255-56. 
 
        Q: O.K. Now, with respect to the collection, it's your testimony 
       that you have an understanding with Mr. Haltzman that his efforts 
       in that direction are on top of what he has already received? 
 
        A. Yes. 
 
App. at 1295-96. 
 
10. Some of the factors on which the District Court relied, however, do 
not support its conclusion that the fee agreement did not permit 
Haltzman to take additional fees for his work in the collection actions. 
First, the District Court concluded that Haltzman's interpretation should 
be rejected because it would amount to impermissible self-dealing by a 
trustee. The court noted that trust law prohibits a trustee from engaging 
in transactions between the trust property and himself individually, and 
concluded that Haltzman's paying himself for the collection actions out 
of the Trust's funds violated this prohibition. The prohibition on self- 
dealing, however, is limited to transactions in property. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts S 170 cmts. b-n; see also 2A Austin Wakeman Scott & 
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Before we may do so, however, we must determine the 
proper nature and scope of our review. This question turns 
on whether the District Court's interpretation of the 
agreement turned on findings of fact, or rather was a 
construction of the contract as a matter of law. We believe 
that the former is true. At the outset of its opinion and 
order, the court stated that it had held a hearing and was 
making "findings of fact and conclusions of law under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 52(a)." See Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *1. 
Furthermore, in interpreting the agreement, the court 
weighed evidence and reached conclusions based on 
witness's credibility. See, e.g., Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, 
at *4 n.15. Finally, the court considered factors, such as 
Backos's testimony as to her own intent, that would only be 
relevant in the context of fact-finding as to the meaning of 
the contract, not in construing it as a matter of law.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of TrustsSS 170.2-.13, at 320-64 (4th 
ed. 1987). The per se prohibition against self-dealing does not apply to 
transactions in services. A trustee's choice to use his own special 
services -- beyond those usually rendered by a trustee -- where the 
trust requires them ordinarily does not violate the prohibition on self- 
dealing. See 3 Scott & Fratcher,supra, S 242.2, at 281-87; see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 242 cmt. d. The only limits on such 
transactions are the trustee's fiduciary duties of good faith and 
reasonable care. See id.; 3 Scott & Fratcher, supra, S 242.2, at 286. 
Accordingly, Haltzman's acceptance of additional fees did not violate the 
rule against self-dealing by a trustee. 
 
The District Court also decided that, if the agreement were construed 
as Haltzman proposed, then his acceptance of the additional fees would 
have violated his duties under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In particular, the court determined that Haltzman would have 
violated the rule requiring that contingent-fee agreements be in writing 
and that attorneys provide written statements concerning the outcome of 
such representation. See Pa. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(c). Haltzman raises 
serious objections to both of the District Court's premises, i.e., whether 
his conduct would have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
whether such a potential violation should guide the interpretation of a 
contract. Since we need not decide this difficult issue, we will not rely 
on 
this aspect of the District Court's reasoning in affirming its judgment. 
Even leaving this point aside, we think there is ample support in the 
record for the District Court's conclusion. 
 
11. Admittedly, several other factors the court considered do fall within 
the ambit of legal construction of a contract, including the contra 
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Although it is a close question, we believe that the court's 
 
interpretation of the retainer agreement, as well as the 
Trust, rested on its findings of fact, and were not 
conclusions of law. 
 
Furthermore, we think that fact-finding concerning the 
meaning of the agreement was appropriate and necessary, 
 
as the agreement was ambiguous on its face. Where a 
contract is ambiguous, the trier of fact must makefindings 
as to the parties' intent and the meaning of the contact. See 
 
In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 389-90 
(3d Cir. 1997). "A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably 
susceptible of different constructions and capable of being 
 
understood in more than one sense." Hutchison v. Sunbeam 
Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1990). Here, the 
agreement made no mention of how the proceeds of any 
judgment or settlement would be collected; it mentioned at 
 
most the contingent-fee percentage and the payment 
method for litigation expenses. It would be reasonable to 
conclude either that the contingent fee included work done 
 
collecting on the settlement or judgment, or that it did not 
include such work. Accordingly, presently before us are the 
District Court's finding of facts interpreting the contract, 
 
which we review for clear error only.12  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
preferentem principle (that a document should be interpreted against its 
drafter), whether the agreement violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and the rule against self-dealing. But these factors can also be 
important in the factual interpretation of a contract. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 203 cmt. a ("The rules of this 
section [concerning interpretation of contracts] . . . apply only in 
choosing among reasonable interpretations."); id. S 206 cmt. a ("[The rule 
of contra preferentem] is in strictness a rule of legal effect . . . as 
well as 
interpretation."). 
 
12. See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. , 120 F.3d 368, 389-90 (3d 
Cir. 1997). "In order to reject a district court's findings of fact, the 
reviewing court, after examining all the evidence, must be left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Durham 
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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B. Factors Considered by the District Court 
 
1. Contract Interpretation 
 
The District Court first concluded that, since Haltzman 
had drafted the representation agreement, ambiguities 
therein should be construed against him. Second, although 
it recognized the principle that contracts (as well as trusts) 
should be construed in accord with the intent of the parties 
(or the settlor), it rejected as self-serving Backos's testimony 
that she intended that Haltzman would be entitled to 
additional fees for collecting on the notes. We address the 
latter issue first, as it is the one upon which Haltzman 
primarily focuses. 
 
a. Parties'/Settlor's Intent: It is beyond  cavil that the 
touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the 
parties. See Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1979). Likewise, the 
settlor's intent is the primary guide to interpreting a trust 
instrument. See Estate of Wolters, 59 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. 
1948); In re Benson, 615 A.2d 792, 794-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992) ("The polestar in every trust is the settlor's intent and 
that intent must prevail." (citation omitted)). Haltzman 
therefore argues that, since Backos -- a party to the 
retainer agreement and the settlor of the Trust-- testified 
to her intent to permit Haltzman additional fees, the 
District Court had no choice but to accept her testimony 
and interpret the Trust and representation agreement in 
accord therewith. We disagree. 
 
A party's testimony as to her intent concerning the 
meaning and effect of a contract can, of course, be 
significant evidence of the meaning of the contract. It is not, 
however, conclusive evidence to that effect. Often, a writing 
itself is the best evidence of the parties' or settlor's intent. 
Delaware County v. Delaware County Prison Employees 
Indep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Pa. 1998) ("The intent 
of the parties to a written contract is deemed to be 
embodied in the writing itself . . . ."); Volunteer Firemen's 
Ins. Services, Inc. v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Agency, 693 
A.2d 1330, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("To determine the 
intent of contracting parties, we look to language contained 
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in the written contract."); Benson, 615 A.2d at 795 ("[T]he 
writing itself must be considered to be the best and 
controlling evidence of the settlor's intent." (quoting In re 
Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank, 208 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. 
1965))). Both the testimony of the parties or settlor and the 
writing itself are evidence of the meaning of the contract; 
the weight due each depends on the usual factors, 
including credibility. 
 
The District Court considered Backos's testimony 
concerning her intent in entering into the fee agreement 
and settling the Trust, but rejected it on credibility 
grounds. Backos testified before the District Court 
concerning her intent in entering into the representation 
agreement and settling the Trust. As noted previously, she 
testified that she intended that Haltzman would be paid 
additional fees out of the Trust for collecting on the notes. 
The District Court found that Backos's testimony was 
simply not credible: 
 
        Although defendant Backos testified at length 
       regarding her understanding of the agreements made 
       between GESEA and Haltzman, we do not accord that 
       aspect of her testimony much weight. We do not 
       question Ms. Backos's level of sophistication in 
       business affairs -- quite to the contrary, her testimony 
       showed her to be an intelligent and very capable 
       businesswoman -- but it is evident from these 
       proceedings that in legal matters she relied exclusively 
       on Haltzman and his firm. Indeed, Haltzman's firm 
       represented her even in this litigation. Thus, it is 
       perhaps not surprising that Ms. Backos's testimony 
       proceeded in virtual lockstep to support defendant 
       Haltzman's various arguments before us. 
 
        Furthermore, to the extent that Ms. Backos's 
       testimony is derived from her own understanding-- 
       rather than Haltzman's influence on that 
       understanding of legal matters -- we also reject it as 
       self-serving. At the time that Ms. Backos entered into 
       representation agreements with Haltzman, she was 
       most influenced by financial pressures which 
       eventually forced her to file bankruptcy. Accordingly, 
       we find that her construction of these agreements 
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       arose almost wholly out of her own individual financial 
       interests, and improperly ignored the interests of 
       GESEA, which she as majority shareholder is required 
       to consider. 
 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *4 n.15. 
 
The credibility of witnesses is quintessentially the 
province of the trial court, not the appellate court. 
"Credibility determinations are the unique province of a fact 
finder, be it a jury, or a judge sitting without a jury." United 
States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 177 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1484 (1999); see also Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); Newark Branch, 
NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 
1998) ("[Clearly erroneous] review is more deferential with 
respect to determinations about the credibility of witnesses 
. . . ." (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we may only reject a 
District Court's finding concerning a witness's credibility in 
rare circumstances. Such circumstances are not present 
here, as the record, as well as common sense, amply 
supports the District Court's conclusion as to the weight to 
be accorded to Backos's testimony. 
 
The District Court observed that Backos's testimony was 
undoubtedly influenced by her close relationship with 
Haltzman, who had represented her throughout the 
underlying RICO litigation and through much of the present 
case. Accordingly, the court's conclusion that Backos's 
testimony can be discounted because of Haltzman's 
influence over it is reasonable. More importantly, we think 
that the District Court had good reason to believe that 
Backos's testimony was influenced by her own biases. The 
court noted that Backos was subject to financial pressures 
that influenced her actions and her testimony. Additionally, 
Backos's testimony was not only helpful to Haltzman, but, 
at least from an ex ante perspective, was directly beneficial 
to Backos herself. Backos was no doubt aware at the time 
she testified that she herself could be held liable for her co- 
trustee's breach in taking fees from the Trust to pay for the 
collection actions. Thus, at least until the District Court 
excused her from liability for Haltzman's breach, Backos 
had her own reason for testifying that Haltzman's actions 
were in accord with her intent in entering into the retainer 
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agreement and settling the Trust. In sum, we perceive no 
clear error in the District Court's decision not to credit 
Backos's testimony. 
 
b. Contra Preferentem: In addition to disc ounting 
Backos's testimony as to her intent, the District Court also 
found it significant, for the purpose of interpreting the 
Trust and retainer agreement, that both documents were 
drafted by Haltzman. It cannot be doubted that "[i]n 
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally 
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the 
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 206. The District Court 
concluded that this traditional canon of contractual 
interpretation supported Dardovitch's reading of the 
retainer agreement and Trust: 
 
       Among other things which Haltzman omitted from his 
       contingent fee agreement with GESEA is an explicit 
       statement of the scope of the representation that the 
       fee agreement embraces. As a matter of contract law, 
       Haltzman's status as drafter of the document requires 
       that all ambiguities be construed against him. All-Pak, 
       Inc. v. Johnson, 694 A.2d 347, 351 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
       1997) (citing Gallagher v. Fidelcor, Inc., 657 A.2d 31 
       (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). 
 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at * 4. The court was correct 
that -- if it applied -- this canon suggests that Haltzman's 
interpretation of the contract should not be adopted. 
 
Haltzman urges that we not apply this canon in favor of 
Dardovitch because Dardovitch was not a party to the fee 
agreement. In particular, he notes that the retainer 
agreement at most was between Haltzman and Backos and 
GESEA, and that GESEA and Backos were the settlors of 
the Trust. Although this is technically true, we think that 
Dardovitch's involvement with the contracts-- as a 
shareholder of GESEA and a beneficiary of the trust -- was 
sufficient that the District Court did not err in relying on 
the fact that Haltzman drafted the agreement and the Trust 
in determining the appropriate interpretation thereof. 
Furthermore, the rule of contra preferentem is based 
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primarily on the idea that the party drafting an agreement 
should bear responsibility for any ambiguities in it, as "he 
is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his 
own interests than for those of the other party." See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 206 cmt. a. Given this 
focus, it was permissible to focus on Haltzman's position as 
drafter in declining to interpret the agreement in his favor. 
Accordingly, we think that the District Court did not err in 
considering the fact that Haltzman drafted the retainer 
agreement in interpreting it. 
 
2. The Meaning of Contingent Fee Agreements 
 
The other basis on which the District Court rested its 
interpretation of the retainer agreement was its 
understanding of contingent fee agreements of the sort 
entered into here. Relying on common-sense and 
straightforward reasoning about lawyers' incentives, as well 
as the language of the retainer agreement, the court 
concluded that the most reasonable reading of the 
agreement was one that permitted no additional payment to 
Haltzman for the collection actions. 
 
        [A]s a matter of common sense the contingent fee 
       cannot be read to exclude collection of the settlement 
       proceeds. We suspect that few lawyers would rest with 
       the hope of 30% of a paper settlement, but not 
       promptly seek collection of the real money that will 
       turn that paper into cash. Indeed, the documents upon 
       which Haltzman seeks to rely notably confirm our 
       suspicion, stating that Haltzman is to receive his fees 
       only on moneys actually "recovered" or "received." 
 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *5. Based on our review of 
the general law governing the responsibilities of contingent 
fee representation, we agree with the District Court. 
 
While the extant case law in this area supports the 
proposition that a contingent-fee attorney is not entitled to 
additional fees for collecting on a judgment, absent 
substantial indications to the contrary, it is sparse.13 This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The case law on a related issue -- the responsibility of a contingent- 
fee attorney with respect to services to be rendered on appeal -- is much 
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issue is most extensively discussed in L.A. Bradshaw, 
Annotation, Construction of Contingent Fee Contract as 
Regards Compensation for Services After Judgment or on 
Appeal, 13 A.L.R.3d 673 (1968). This annotation discusses 
a number of cases in which attorneys have attempted to 
recover additional fees beyond an established contingent fee 
for collection efforts. These cases establish that, absent 
some significant evidence that the collection efforts were 
not within the contemplation of the parties at the time they 
entered into the contingent fee agreement, no additional 
fees will be permitted. 
 
Those cases in which additional fees have been permitted 
have involved collection efforts far beyond those which the 
parties anticipated at the time the representation began. In 
Barcus v. Gates, 130 F. 364 (E.D. Va.), affd., 136 F. 184 
(4th Cir. 1904), for example, parol evidence established 
that, when the parties entered into a ten-percent contingent 
fee agreement, they expected the case to settle quickly 
without even filing a suit. When instead a highly contested 
suit was required, and the attorney was required to spend 
an additional month after trial determining what, if 
anything, could be recovered from the various defendants, 
the court concluded that the attorney should be entitled to 
additional fees for these collection efforts. See Barcus, 130 
F. at 369-70; see also Serat v. Smith, 15 N.Y.S. 330 (Sup. 
Ct. 1891) (additional fee permitted where parties did not 
contemplate that collection would be difficult). Similarly, in 
Judah v. Trustees of Vincennes Univ., 16 Ind. 56 (1861), 
discussed in 13 A.L.R.3d at _____, the court permitted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
more developed. See, e.g., Quarture v. Allegheny County, 14 A.2d 575 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) (attorney working for contingent fee was not 
entitled to additional fee for prosecuting appeal, even where attorney 
believed that appeal was unlikely to result in an increased damages 
award). Other courts have cited this case law without analysis in support 
of the proposition that contingent fee attorneys may not recover 
additional fees for collection actions. See, e.g., Goldstein & Price v. 
Tonkin 
& Mondl, 974 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Mrozinski v. 
Marinello, 260 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Although it provides some 
support for the result we reach, we do not find the analogy to Quarture 
terribly convincing, as prosecuting an appeal involves the same course of 
representation as the underlying litigation in a more obvious sense than 
an action to collect on the proceeds of a settlement or judgment. 
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additional fees for collection where the attorney's efforts 
involved lobbying the state legislature to release funds to 
pay the judgment. In contrast, where the record reveals 
that the parties had no reason to believe that collection 
would require more than minimal effort, attorneys have 
been permitted no additional fee for collection actions. See, 
e.g., Mrozinski v. Marinello, 260 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 
1965); Ellis v. Mitchell, 85 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1948), 
affd., 88 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1949); Emil 
Nathan & Co. v Halsell, 45 So. 856 (Miss. 1908). 
 
This understanding of the responsibility of attorneys in 
contingent fee cases is, as the District Court pointed out, 
consonant with the incentives confronting such an 
attorney. "We suspect that few lawyers would rest with the 
hope of 30% of a paper settlement, but not promptly seek 
collection of real money that will turn that paper into cash." 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *5. The attorney has just as 
much of an interest in collecting on the judgment as the 
client, and thus should need no extra incentive in the form 
of additional fees for doing so. We believe that this reading 
comports with the general understanding of the community 
of attorneys. 
 
This conclusion is also supported by the reasoning of the 
court in Goldstein & Price v. Tonkin & Mondl, 974 S.W.2d 
543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). In that case, the court concluded 
that, since the fee agreement permitted a fee of"1/3 of all 
monies recovered by judgment or settlement," Goldstein & 
Price, 974 S.W.2d at 546 -- as opposed to"1/3 of any 
recovery of judgment or settlement" -- the attorney was 
only entitled to a contingent fee from money actually 
received. See 974 S.W.2d at 548. The language of the fee 
agreement in the present case is similar: the original 
agreement permitted Haltzman a fee of "30% of any amount 
recovered," and later versions permitted a fee out of "any 
recovery received" or "any amount received." We believe 
that if an attorney wishes to protect himself, and provide 
for attorney's fees in the event additional collection efforts 
are necessary, he should do so explicitly in the retainer 
agreement. We agree with the District Court that this 
is the common-sense understanding of contingent-fee 
agreements. 
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The two pieces of record evidence that Haltzman cites to 
support his contention that collection efforts were not 
contemplated as part of the retainer agreement do not alter 
our conclusion. First, he contends that, at the time of 
settlement, he did not think that collection efforts would be 
difficult, as reflected by the fact that he was willing to 
accept notes from the defendants. But he testified that he 
accepted notes because the defendants did not have a lot of 
money; given this concern, one might expect that they 
would have difficulty paying off the notes as well, and that 
collection efforts might be necessary. Second, Haltzman 
points out that Backos wrote to Dardovitch after the 
settlement indicating that collection efforts might be 
necessary and that Haltzman would be paid additional fees 
for them. Both of these submissions share an additional 
fundamental flaw: they say nothing about what the parties 
contemplated at the time they entered into the retainer 
agreement. There is simply no evidence in the record that 
the parties had any reason to think, or actually did think, 
that collection efforts following judgment in the RICO 
litigation would be minimal. Accordingly, we conclude the 
District Court was correct to conclude that the retainer 
agreement in this case, as with most contingent fee 
agreements, permitted no additional fee for collateral 
collection activities. 
 
C. Summary 
 
The District Court identified several reasons why the 
retainer agreement should be interpreted to cover 
Haltzman's efforts to collect on the notes, thereby 
preventing him from collecting additional fees for these 
efforts from the Trust. In particular, the District Court was 
correct to note that ordinary rules of contract 
interpretation, as well as a common-sense understanding of 
the typical duties of an attorney working for a contingent 
fee, support this reading. Although Haltzman has raised 
some questions about some other aspects of the court's 
reasoning, see supra note 10, we are not,"after examining 
all the evidence, . . . left with a definite andfirm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed" in interpreting the 
retainer agreement, Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 147, and thus 
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do not believe that the District Court's conclusion was 
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court's order to the extent that it found that Haltzman 
breached his fiduciary duty by accepting the additional fees 
from the Trust. 
 
IV. Haltzman's Liability for Attorney's Fees 
 
A. District Court Decision 
 
Haltzman also appeals from the District Court's decision 
to require him to pay Dardovitch's attorney's fees in this 
litigation. The court ordered Haltzman to pay $59,000 in 
attorney's fees to Dardovitch, as well as $4,735.52 in costs. 
 
The District Court based its decision to award attorney's 
fees primarily on Haltzman's actions in refusing to provide 
Dardovitch with an accounting of the Trust's funds. See 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *7. It noted that"Backos 
and Haltzman spent the better part of this long, 
acrimonious litigation resisting Dardovitch's demand to 
provide an account or even a copy of the Trust instrument, 
insisting from the beginning that he was not a beneficiary 
of the Trust." 1998 WL 13271, at *7. It also observed that 
the defendants continued to deny that Dardovitch was a 
beneficiary of the Trust entitled to an accounting even after 
the court granted Dardovitch summary judgment on the 
ground that it was incontrovertible that he was a 
beneficiary. See 1998 WL 13271, at *7. Concluding that 
"the trustees' failure to recognize basic principles of trust 
law [wa]s a breach of fiduciary duty that can only have 
resulted from bad faith or, at a minimum, gross 
negligence," the court found Haltzman liable for 
Dardovitch's attorney's fees. 1998 WL 13271, at *7. The 
court also noted, however, that Haltzman should be liable 
for Dardovitch's fees because he blatantly breached his 
fiduciary duty in accepting additional fees from the Trust 
for the collection actions. 
 
In calculating the fees owed, the District Court divided 
the litigation into two phases, before and after the 
accounting. The pre-Accounting litigation revolved primarily 
around determining whether Dardovitch was in fact a 
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beneficiary entitled to demand an accounting, although it 
included some other matters, such as discovery disputes 
and litigation of subject-matter jurisdiction and Haltzman's 
right to demand a jury trial. After the District Court granted 
Dardovitch's motion for partial summary judgment and 
Backos and Haltzman provided an accounting, the parties 
litigated and held a hearing concerning a number of 
substantive issues. This post-Accounting litigation focused 
on resolving Dardovitch's objections to the accounting itself, 
along with his more general claims against Haltzman and 
Backos, but it also included collateral matters, such as the 
determination of the attorney's fee award. 
 
The court took Dardovitch's request for approximately 
$60,000 in pre-Accounting fees, and reduced it to $50,000 
"to (1) account for activity unrelated to the trustees' 
malfeasances and (2) reflect more accurately the value 
conferred to the Trust as a result of the account." 
Appellant's Brf. App. 1, at 7. With respect to the post- 
Accounting fees, the District Court substantially reduced 
these from the amount Dardovitch requested. In so doing, 
it noted that he had not prevailed on his non-trust claims, 
as well as on a majority of his objections and exceptions to 
the accounting. On the other hand, it recognized that he 
did prevail in significant part in his objections to the 
accounting, which resulted in the return of substantial 
funds to the Trust corpus. Accordingly, it awarded him 
about 25% of the amount he had requested, or $9,000. In 
addition, the court awarded Dardovitch his costs in full. 
 
B. Is Haltzman Liable for Dardovitch's Attorney's Fees? 
 
Haltzman contends that the District Court had no power 
to direct him to pay Dardovitch's attorney's fees at all. 
Dardovitch responds that the court has the power under 
trust law to award attorney's fees. In particular, a court 
deciding a trust case can grant a beneficiary attorney's fees 
from the trustee where the beneficiary's legal action results 
in the creation or preservation of the trust in general, and 
where the trustee breaches his fiduciary duty with more 
than ordinary fault. We begin by explicating these general 
principles in greater detail; we then apply them to analyze 
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the District Court's attorney's fee awards for the two phases 
of the litigation. 
 
1. General Principles Governing Award of Attorney's Fees 
Awards in Trust Actions 
 
Although Dardovitch suggested a number of bases for the 
award of attorney's fees, the District Court relied on general 
common-law equity principles in granting the request. 
Pennsylvania follows the so-called American Rule regarding 
the award of attorney's fees: "[T]here can be no recovery for 
counsel fees from the adverse party to a cause, in the 
absence of express statutory allowance of the same, or clear 
agreement by the parties, or some other established 
exception." First State Underwriters Agency of New England 
Reins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1318 (3d 
Cir. 1986).14 One of the more common exceptions to the 
American Rule is that attorney's fees are available at the 
discretion of the court in cases involving trusts. See Estate 
of Tose, 393 A.2d 629 (Pa. 1978). 
 
A prominent treatise best summarizes the principles 
behind this exception: 
 
        In suits to enforce the rights of trust beneficiaries the 
       court exercises its discretion as to the allowance of 
       attorney fees and costs, either from the trust estate or 
       from other sources. . . . 
 
        In exercising its discretion in these matters the court 
       will consider whether the plaintiff or other party was 
       successful in obtaining the relief requested or in 
       defending or conserving the trust estate, for example, 
       by protecting the trust against an unjust claim. The 
       court may also consider whether the successful party 
       benefitted or enhanced the trust estate in deciding 
       whether his attorneys' fees should be awarded from the 
       trust estate. These considerations are sometimes 
       expressed as the common fund doctrine or the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Because this is a diversity case, the relevant state law concerning 
attorney's fees applies. See Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Contemporary 
Real Estate Assocs., 979 F.2d 329, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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       substantial benefit rule, either of which allows the 
       successful party reasonable attorneys' fees. 
 
        In exercising its discretion the court may consider 
       other factors such as the nature and extent of the 
       defendant's wrongful conduct, and whether there was 
       good faith on the part of the defendant. 
 
        A further question relates to the source from which 
       the costs and fees should be paid. In some cases the 
       courts have held that the fees of the successful plaintiff 
       should be paid from the principal of the trust estate 
       because the trust had been protected or enhanced. In 
       other cases the trustee or other party defendant has 
       been held personally liable for the plaintiff 's costs and 
       fees. 
 
16 George Gleason Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees S 871, at 184-97 (rev. 2d ed. 1998) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Annotation, Allowance of Attorneys' Fees 
in, or Other Costs of, Litigation by Beneficiary Respecting 
Trust, 9 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1950). Pennsylvania courts have 
adopted these principles. See Estate of Trimble , 140 A.2d 
609 (Pa. 1958) (beneficiary may be entitled to a fee award 
where action results in preservation of funds of trust); 
Estate of Kline, 124 A. 280 (Pa. 1924) (trustee may be 
required to pay fees incurred as a result of his actions); 
Estate of Wescott, 72 Pa. D. & C. 519 (Orph. Ct. 1951) 
(beneficiary may be entitled to a fee award in an action 
brought to establish the validity of a trust). 
 
Most importantly for our review, the District Court's 
discretion in deciding whether to grant attorney's fees in an 
equity case is exceedingly broad. "The allowance of counsel 
fees, where recoverable, rests largely in the discretion of the 
trial court which heard the principal action." Williams v. 
Williams, 540 A.2d 563, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing 
Estate of Ward, 38 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1944))." `The allowance 
or disallowance of counsel fees rests generally in the 
judgment of the court of the first instance and its decision 
will not be interfered with except for palpable error.' " 
Trimble, 140 A.2d at 615 (quoting Ward)."The 
determination of the award of attorneys' fees is within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be 
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overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Security Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Contemporary Real Estate Assocs. , 979 F.2d 
329, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we must determine 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
determining that Haltzman should be liable for some of 
Dardovitch's attorney's fees. "An abuse of discretion may be 
found when the district court's decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact." Reform Party v. 
Allegheny County Dept. of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 
2. Fees for Pre-Accounting Litigation 
 
The District Court awarded Dardovitch most of the 
requested fees for litigation during the period prior to the 
court's decision requiring the trustees to account. It based 
this decision on Haltzman's continued refusal -- both when 
Dardovitch requested such information and after this 
litigation was instituted -- to recognize Dardovitch's status 
as a beneficiary entitled to information about the Trust, 
particularly given that he was specifically named in the 
Trust as someone entitled to receive funds. The court 
concluded that the only possible explanation for this 
conduct was bad faith, and accordingly ordered Haltzman 
to pay most of Dardovitch's attorney's fees expended in 
establishing his right to demand an accounting. We 
perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court's 
decision. 
 
As noted above, a trustee may be found liable for a 
beneficiary's attorney's fees when the trustee has acted 
wrongfully, especially where the litigation itself is made 
necessary by the trustee's defalcation. See Kline. For 
example, in In re Catell's Estate, 38 A.2d 466 (Del. Ch. Ct. 
1944), the trustee failed to give a bond as required by the 
settlor. The beneficiaries of the trust brought an action to 
have the trustee removed, but the court refused to remove 
the trustee because he gave the bond after the suit was 
filed and the trust suffered no loss. In spite of the fact that 
the beneficiaries did not receive the relief they sought, the 
court ordered the trustee to pay their attorney's fees as the 
suit was made necessary only because of the trustee's 
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failure to observe the clear terms of the trust. See also 
Tucker v. Brown, 150 P.2d 604 (Wisc. 1944) (where a 
trustee repudiated the trust and refused to account, a 
beneficiary who successfully sues him to enforce the trust 
is entitled to costs from the personal funds of the trustee). 
 
We think it clear that the lengthy pre-Accounting 
litigation was necessitated by Haltzman's persistent refusal 
to provide Dardovitch with an accounting. This refusal 
began in letters sent to Dardovitch denying him any 
information about the Trust and threatening him with 
litigation. It continued through the lengthy proceedings 
before the District Court granted Dardovitch's motion for 
partial summary judgment. The District Court also noted 
that, even after it determined as a matter of law that 
Dardovitch was a beneficiary entitled to an accounting, 
Haltzman continued to deny that Dardovitch was a 
beneficiary of the Trust. See Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at 
*7 ("Moreover, to this day the trustees continue to deny 
that plaintiff is entitled to an accounting . . . despite our 
Order . . . in which we stated that `[i]t would be hard to 
imagine a clearer example' of a trust beneficiary than one 
in plaintiff 's position."). 
 
Furthermore, the litigation provided a benefit to the 
Trust, as it brought about an accounting of the Trust that 
exposed breaches of fiduciary duty. Under the trustees' 
apparent understanding of the term "beneficiary," no one 
was entitled to seek an accounting. Thus, by bringing the 
litigation, Dardovitch forced the trustees to give an account 
for their actions, which they otherwise would not have 
done. This was undoubtedly of benefit to the Trust. In 
addition, aside from the intrinsic benefit of having an 
accounting performed, the accounting here exposed the 
breach of fiduciary duty discussed above. As a result of this 
exposure, a substantial amount of funds will be preserved 
for the beneficiaries. Accordingly, we do not believe that the 
District Court abused its discretion in awarding Dardovitch 
attorney's fees for the pre-Accounting litigation to be paid 
by Haltzman. 
 
3. Fees for Post-Accounting Litigation 
 
The District Court also awarded Dardovitch a portion of 
the attorney's fees he requested for work done after the 
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court called the trustees to account. It based this award on 
the fact that Dardovitch's litigation of his objections to the 
accounting resulted in a benefit to the Trust to the extent 
that it resulted in the return of funds to the Trust, as well 
as a reduction in the potential liabilities of the Trust, i.e., 
it would not in the future need to pay Haltzman for 
collecting on the notes. In addition, it required Haltzman to 
pay these fees because it found he breached hisfiduciary 
duty in a way that resulted in a direct benefit to himself, 
i.e., the additional fees themselves. 
 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion here 
either. One of the situations in which a court may award 
attorney's fees is where the litigation results in a benefit to 
the trust as whole. See Trimble. Here, as a result of 
Dardovitch's objections to the account, Haltzman was 
ordered to return certain fees to the Trust, and will not be 
permitted in the future to withdraw additional fees. 
Furthermore, the District Court appropriately ordered the 
trustee himself, as opposed to the Trust, to pay the fees. By 
accepting the additional fees for the collection actions, 
Haltzman, an attorney, not only breached his fiduciary 
duty, but did so in a way that resulted in a direct benefit 
to himself. This case is thus unlike those in which a trustee 
breaches his duty by making an improper investment, 
which causes a loss to the trust estate but no 
corresponding gain to the trustee. Although, as discussed 
above, Haltzman did not engage in per se impermissible 
self-dealing, his breach of trust resulting in a direct profit 
to him justifies the District Court's award of attorney's fees 
in favor Dardovitch to be paid by Haltzman. Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court's decision that Haltzman 
should be liable for Dardovitch's attorney's fees, at least in 
part. 
 
C. Calculation of the Fee Award Amount 
 
Although we will affirm the District Court's decision to 
award attorney's fees, we will vacate the order and remand 
the matter because the District Court did not properly 
determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. 
Dardovitch requested $60,712.78 in pre-Accounting fees, 
and $35,649 in post-Accounting fees. Without holding a 
 
                                34 
  
hearing, the District Court found that the hourly rates were 
reasonable, but reduced the awards to $50,000 and $9,000 
respectively. It calculated these amounts as follows: the 
$50,000 pre-Accounting award was reduced from the 
$60,000 Dardovitch requested based on the fact that 
Dardovitch's attorneys had performed some work before the 
accounting unrelated to establishing Dardovitch's status as 
a beneficiary, and so as to reflect more accurately the value 
conferred on the Trust by the accounting. It based the 
$9,000 post-Accounting award on a roughly 75% reduction 
of the requested fee, which it derived from Dardovitch's lack 
of success on his pre-Trust claims and several of his 
objections to the accounting, along with his substantial 
success on a major objection to the accounting. 
 
We think that our recent decision in Security Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. of New York v. Contemporary Real Estate 
Associates, 979 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1992), controls. There, in 
an action for collection on a mortgage note that included a 
provision for attorney's fees, the district court ordered the 
debtor to pay the lender's attorney's fees without holding a 
hearing, making a finding as to the reasonableness of the 
fees, and without explaining the rationale for the award. We 
vacated the award: 
 
        Defendant requested discovery regarding attorney's 
       fees. The district court implicitly denied this request by 
       approving the second proposed form of judgment 
       submitted by Security Mutual. . . . [I]t conducted no 
       hearing and made no findings of fact as to the 
       reasonableness of the fees requested and gave no 
       statement as to the standard governing its award. 
       Thus, we cannot adequately review the reasonableness 
       of the action of the district court in awarding counsel 
       fees under the circumstances. We conclude that its 
       action was not consistent with a sound exercise of 
       discretion under Pennsylvania law. 
 
Security Mut., 979 F.2d at 332; see also Estate of 
Brockerman, 480 A.2d 1199, 1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 
(remanding fee award where record did not indicate"what 
hourly rate the firm charged, what the prevailing rate in the 
general area was at the time, what services were performed, 
or how much time those services consumed"); cf. Estate of 
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Baker, 401 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1979) (no remand necessary 
where trial court heard lengthy testimony and made 
extensive findings regarding the services rendered by the 
attorney, the difficulty of the actions undertaken, and the 
reasonableness of the fee request as a whole); Sewak v. 
Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 
The District Court's fee award in this case is like that in 
Security Mutual. In determining the fee award, the District 
Court relied only upon Dardovitch's submission, which 
included statements from the attorneys and their time 
records. The court held no hearing on this issue, and 
Haltzman had no opportunity to challenge on a factual 
basis the fee requested. Haltzman in fact identifies several 
contested factual issues concerning the attorney's fee 
award, including whether the fees were incurred in 
response to abusive conduct, whether Dardovitch presented 
adequate documentation for the fees, and whether 
Dardovitch is entitled to fees for preparation of the fee 
petition.15 
 
Furthermore, the reasoning supporting the District 
Court's decision to reduce the fee awarded below that 
requested is sketchy. For instance, the court reduced the 
fee award for pre-Accounting litigation by $10,000"to 
account for activity unrelated to the trustees' malfeasances 
and [to] reflect more accurately the value conferred to the 
Trust as a result of the account." We cannot determine 
from the record whether this reduction was supported. 
Likewise, the District Court awarded Dardovitch only 25% 
of his request for post-Accounting fees, because many of 
his objections to the account failed. But we cannot 
determine from the record whether the 25% figure 
accurately represents the amount of work expended on the 
successful claim. The District Court was fully familiar with 
the record and perhaps instinctively reached the correct 
result; because it did not hold a hearing and set forth an 
adequate explanation of its calculations, however, we 
cannot be sure that its award of attorney's fees was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In identifying these issues, we express no opinion whether and the 
extent to which they are significant in the determination of attorney's 
fees. 
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consistent with the exercise of sound discretion. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the attorney's fee award and 
remand this matter to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
 
V. Backos's Liability 
 
Dardovitch cross-appeals from the District Court's order 
excusing Backos from liability for the repayment of the 
attorney's fees improperly paid to Haltzman for the 
collection actions. He contends that Backos was negligent 
in failing to prevent Haltzman from breaching the Trust, 
and therefore should be jointly liable with Haltzman. 
Dardovitch further submits that Backos should not be 
excused from liability because she relied on the advice of 
her attorney, i.e., Haltzman. 
 
The District Court's holding concerning Backos's liability 
is somewhat murky. Its discussion of the issue occurs 
mainly in the context of liability for Dardovitch's attorney's 
fees. During its explanation of why Backos would not be 
jointly liable with Haltzman for Dardovitch's attorney's fees, 
the court inserted a footnote stating that it would not hold 
Backos liable for the underlying breach of fiduciary duty. 
"While there is ample evidence of Ms. Backos's neglect as 
trustee which might be construed to support [a claim 
against her for imputed breach of fiduciary duty], for the 
reasons stated supra . . . we think that her co-trustee's 
malfeasance should not be imputed to Ms. Backos." 
Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *8 n.28. In the referenced 
portion of the opinion, the court stated as follows: 
 
       We do not question Ms. Backos's level of sophistication 
       in business affairs -- quite to the contrary, her 
       testimony showed her to be an intelligent and very 
       capable businesswoman -- but it is evident from these 
       proceedings that in legal matters she relied exclusively 
       on Haltzman and his firm. Indeed, Haltzman's firm 
       represented her even in this litigation. 
 
1998 WL 13271, at *4 n.15. Because of Backos's reliance 
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on counsel, and Haltzman in particular, the District Court 
excused her from liability.16 
 
A trustee must exercise reasonable care to ensure that 
his or her co-trustees do not breach their fiduciary duties. 
In general, of course, "[a] trustee is not liable to the 
beneficiary for a breach of trust committed by a co-trustee." 
Herr v. United States Cas. Co., 31 A.2d 533, 534 (Pa. 1943) 
(quoting Restatement (First) of Trusts S 224(1)); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 224(1); 3 Scott & Fratcher, 
supra, S 224, at 401. This is not an absolute rule, however: 
 
        A trustee is liable to the beneficiary, if he (a) 
       participates in a breach of trust committed by his co- 
       trustee; or (b) improperly delegates the administration 
       of the trust to his co-trustee; or (c) approves or 
       acquiesces in or conceals a breach of trust committed 
       by his co-trustee; or (d) by his failure to exercise 
       reasonable care in the administration of the trust has 
       enabled his co-trustee to commit a breach of trust; or 
       (e) neglects to take proper steps to compel his co- 
       trustee to redress a breach of trust. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 224(2); accord 3 Scott & 
Fratcher, supra, S 224, at 401 (same); see also Herr, 31 
A.2d at 534 (quoting in part Restatement (First) of Trusts 
S 224(2)). 
 
These exceptions flow out of the general duty of each co- 
trustee with respect to the action of his or her fellows. "If 
there are several trustees, each trustee is under a duty to 
the beneficiary to participate in the administration of the 
trust and to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee 
from committing a breach of trust or to compel a co-trustee 
to redress a breach of trust." Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts S 184. "A fiduciary is required to use such common 
skill, prudence and caution as a prudent man, under 
similar circumstances, would exercise in connection with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We apply plenary review to this question, since it concerns whether 
the District Court applied the proper legal standard-- subjective 
reasonableness in relying on advice of counsel versus objective 
reasonableness. See In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
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the management of his own estate." Estate of Lohm, 269 
A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 1970); see also Estate of Lerch, 159 A.2d 
506, 509 (Pa. 1960). This duty of care is not reduced even 
if the specific trustee lacks skill in some respects. See 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 174 cmt. a ("A trustee is 
liable for a loss resulting from his failure to use the care 
and skill of a man of ordinary prudence, although he may 
have exercised all the care and skill of which he was 
capable."). 
 
Pennsylvania case law demonstrates the extent to which 
simple, passive negligence can give rise to liability for the 
breaches of a co-trustee. In Estate of Adams, 70 A. 436 (Pa. 
1908), the court held a trustee liable for his negligent 
failure to prevent a breach by a co-trustee, even where he 
had previously taken some steps to present such a breach. 
The trust corpus in Adams included some bonds that were 
held in a safe deposit box that the trustees had agreed they 
would not open unless both were present. One trustee, who 
was aware that the other was in financial distress, 
discovered that the bonds were missing in 1896. He then 
confronted the other trustee, who returned the bonds and 
agreed not to open the box in the first's absence. The first 
trustee did not inform the bank of this arrangement. He 
became an invalid in 1904, shortly after the trustees' last 
joint visit to the safety deposit box. The second trustee died 
in 1906, at which time it was discovered that the bonds 
were missing. The court in Adams affirmed the Orphan's 
Court's conclusion that the first trustee had acted 
negligently and should be held liable for the missing bonds. 
 
In Estate of Reyburn, 43 Pa. D. & C. 85 (Orph. Ct. 1942), 
the court held a trustee liable for the breach of his co- 
trustee where he relied on his co-trustee's expertise to the 
trust's detriment. The co-trustee in Reyburn, a trust 
company, invested certain trust funds in assets in which 
the settlor had indicated trust funds could not be invested. 
The individual trustee knew nothing about the terms of the 
will limiting the possible investments, nor was he aware of 
those facts that indicated that the assets were not proper 
investments. He simply assumed that they were appropriate 
because he presumed that the trust company would not 
have purchased them if they were not appropriate. The 
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court found that the individual trustee was liable for the 
trust company's breach because he was negligent in failing 
to oversee the company's actions. Furthermore, since the 
trust company had not actively misstated material facts 
relating to the investment, he was not excused from liability 
for relying on its expertise. In particular, the court stated 
that "there is no presumption of greater competence in a 
trust company than in an individual." 43 Pa. D. &. C. at 
90. 
 
Furthermore, advice of counsel is not an absolute defense 
to liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, including liability 
for the defalcation of a co-trustee. "Although the court will 
consider that the executor acted upon the advice of counsel 
in determining whether he acted in good faith, this does not 
provide the executor with complete immunity to a 
surcharge." Estate of Geniviva, 675 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1996) (citing Lohm, 269 A.2d at 455); see also 
Lohm, 269 A.2d at 455 ("Where a fiduciary acts upon the 
advice of counsel, such fact is a factor to be considered in 
determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in 
all circumstances." (citations and quotations omitted)). "The 
initial choice of counsel must have been prudent under all 
the circumstances then existing, and the subsequent 
decision to rely upon this counsel must also have been a 
reasonably wise and prudent choice." Lohm, 269 A.2d at 
455; see also Geniviva, 675 A.2d at 310. 
 
The District Court did not analyze Backos's liability 
under the principles set forth above. Essentially, the court 
required of Backos only subjective good faith; it excused 
Backos from liability solely because she relied on 
Haltzman's advice and counsel in performing her duties as 
trustee. But, as is clear from the preceding discussion, 
subjective good faith is only the beginning of the inquiry. If 
Backos relied on counsel, she must have done so 
reasonably, i.e., making a prudent choice of counsel and 
taking reasonable care to ensure that counsel performed 
effectively. Furthermore, even if she relied reasonably on 
counsel, Backos must have acted reasonably in performing 
her duties as a whole in order to avoid liability. The District 
Court reached none of these issues; hence, we will vacate 
the District Court's order to the extent it relieved Backos 
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from liability for Haltzman's breach, and remand for further 
proceedings in this regard.17 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the District Court 
will be affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. The parties will bear their own costs. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We note that this does not necessarily leave Backos potentially liable 
for the entire amount of the surcharge, because rights of indemnity and 
contribution exist in trust cases. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
S 258(1). Furthermore, although the District Court erred in excusing 
Backos without additional inquiry from liability for the breach of trust 
itself, we do not think it erred in placing the burden of paying 
Dardovitch's attorney's fees solely on Haltzman. Unlike liability for a 
breach of trust, which is based only on a reasonable care test, an award 
of attorney's fees against a trustee, as discussed above, turns on the 
defendant's active culpability. The District Court found that Backos's 
conduct arose from "excusable neglect," and not bad faith, especially in 
comparison with Haltzman, Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271, at *8, and 
excused her from liability for the attorney's fees. We find no error in 
this 
conclusion. 
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